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1 Introduction
The incidence of self-employment increased in the United States since the mid-1970s, both among
men and women. This phenomenon is well-documented by Blau (1987), Devine (1994a, 1994b),
Lombard (2001) and many others. While there was some controversy over whether this represented
a sustained increase for men, there was a general consensus that this represented a long-term
trend for women, with the self-employment rate increasing both absolutely and relative to total
female employment (Budig, 2003). Moreover, Devine (1994a) and Lombard (2001) emphasized the
prevalence of married women in self-employment.
The absolute increase in the numbers of self-employed women is not surprising in itself. This
could simply be a consequence of their increasing labor force participation. And the large shift from
industrial employment to service sector employment during the 1980s expanded the opportunities
for self-employment, thus potentially accounting for the relative increase in self-employment rates.
However, as the incidence of self-employment rose in the U.S., there was a concurrent trend of
rising health care costs.1 The linkage between health care costs and the labor market comes from
a unique feature of the U.S. health care system.
In the U.S., employment-based health insurance is the dominant form of financing health care;
over two-thirds of non-elderly Americans receive h alth insurance through employers, either their
own or that of a family member (Cutler, 2002). This is due to the fact that the tax code in the
U.S. subsidizes employer payments for health insurance, by excluding these payments from both
income and payroll taxes. On the other hand, employee contributions for health insurance are
paid with after-tax dollars. Thus, employers have an incentive to finance insurance premium costs
rather than shift these costs to employees. Even if employees bear the full incidence of these costs
in the form of lower wages, group rates of insurance offered by employers are substantially below
individually-purchased insurance rates due to adverse selection in insurance markets.
The above factors make the after-tax price of employer-provided health insurance substantially
lower than the price of individually-purchased health insurance. These features, in effect, create
a wedge in the price of health insurance between the wage-employment sector on the one hand,
and the self-employment and non-employment sectors on the other. This price wedge is likely to
create a distortion in employment-sector decisions; for some workers who have a preference for
1Between 1980 and 2001, estimates suggest that the total cost of employer-sponsored health insurance benefits
increased four times faster than the cost of living (Employment Trends, 2003).
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being self-employed, the price of selecting into their desired sector of employment may be too high.
Married couples, however, have the opportunity to appropriate the surplus created by the price
wedge; health coverage through the spouse’s health insurance plan allows married workers who
enjoy this benefit to effectively eliminate the price wedge. This could explain the predominance of
married women in self-employment.
This problem is important because the U.S. labor market is perceived as a very flexible market
relative to that of other industrialized countries, in terms of the availability of part-time jobs and
access to flexible work schedules. However, employers rarely, if ever, provide health benefits to part-
time workers. And as stated above, the self-employed do not receive a tax benefit that is comparable
to the benefit extended to employment-based health insurance. Thus, in addition to the problem
of adverse selection in insurance markets, the prevalence of the system of employer-provided health
insurance with the associated tax advantages imposes a cost on individuals opting for flexible work
schedules, in the form of higher after-tax prices for health insurance.2 Given the high and rising
cost of health insurance, this price wedge is likely to significantly affect an individuals choice of
employment sector.
There is an extensive literature on the effect of employment-based health insurance on various
labor market outcomes3 Notably, there is compelling evidence that insurance has a significant effect
on the timing of retirement; individuals with post-retirement health insurance provided by their
employer are likely to retire much earlier than those without such insurance. The literature on
‘job-lock’ suggests that health insurance plays an important role in the job-mobility decisions of
individuals. Moreover, the effect of this form of insurance on the labor supply decisions - mainly
hours of work - of secondary earners is also well established.4 However, there has been very little
research on the effect of employment-based insurance on households’ choice of employment sector.5
This neglect is surprising, given the sharp increase in self-employment rates since the mid-1970s.
One of the reasons for the absence of convincing empirical evidence on this relationship is the
difficulty in finding an exogenous source of variation in health insurance prices.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) provides an opportunity to isolate the effect of the
price of health insurance on employment-sector choices. TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for the
2Holtz-Eakin et.al. (1996) state that for comparable insurance plans and benefits, small businesses and the self-
employed pay 10%-40% more in health insurance costs, relative to those in wage-salary employment.
3Gruber and Madrian (2002) review the literature.
4See Buchmueller and Valletta (1999), for example.
5DeCicca (2008), Fairlie et.al. (2008), Gumus and Regan (2009) and Seldon (2009) are notable exceptions.
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self-employed to purchase their own health insurance. This subsidy effectively lowered the after-
tax cost of health insurance for the self-employed. However, individuals enjoying health coverage
through the insurance plan of a family member could not avail of this benefit. Using the Current
Population Survey (CPS) data for the relevant period, I therefore test whether this policy change
induced more women without spousal health coverage to select into self-employment.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I discuss the methodological issues that arise
in estimating the impact of spousal health benefits on a womans choice of work sector. Section
3 describes the data set used for the analysis and presents some descriptive statistics. I discuss
the empirical strategy for testing my hypothesis in Section 4 and present my results in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Health Insurance and the Tax Reform Act 1986
The U.S. tax system favors employer-provided health insurance over individually-purchased insur-
ance in several respects. “Employer-provided insurance strictly dominates insurance purchased on
own account for both itemizing and non-itemizing taxpayers, due to the higher loading factors on
individual policies, the full deductibility of employer-provided insurance expenditures relative to
the partial deductibility of own insurance expenditures, and the deductibility of employer-provided
health insurance from the payroll tax as well as the income tax.” (Gruber and Poterba, 1994). Four
other papers examine the linkage between women’s employment-sector choices and spousal health
insurance.
Using cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey for the 1975-87 period, Devine
(1994a, 1994b) found that self-employed women were more likely to be married, to be covered
by someone elses health plan and to work non-standard hours. Using the same data source for a
later period, Lombard (2001) found that women’s likelihood of self-employment rises with health
coverage through the spouse. Wellington (2001) used a CPS Benefits supplement to estimate the
impact of health insurance coverage through the spouse on the probability of self-employment, and
found evidence of a positive association between these variables. None of these papers examine the
effect of the price of health insurance on the decision to become self-employed.
If there are no unobserved factors affecting the employment-sector decisions of households,
then using cross-sectional variation in spousal health insurance coverage, after controlling for other
observed characteristics, would correctly identify the effect of the price of health insurance on
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self-employment propensities. However, if there are factors affecting spouses’ employment sector
decisions that are not observed by the econometrician, then these estimates may be biased.
For instance, it is possible that the observed pattern of assignment of married workers across
employment sectors is driven by heterogeneity in the taste for risk. A married household that is
maximizing joint household utility may have one spouse taking up a risky entrepreneurial venture
with the objective of making higher returns relative to the wage-salary sector, with the other
spouse working in the less risky wage sector and providing the capital to finance the business
venture. On the other hand, a more risk-loving couple may decide that the benefits of flexibility
and higher potential returns in self-employment outweigh the costs of higher risk. If employment
sector decisions are based purely on these risk-return trade-offs, changes in the price of health
insurance will have no effect on shifting workers across sectors. We thus need a methodological
approach that allows us to disentangle these effects.
The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy on health insurance purchases by the self-employed.
After this reform, self-employed individuals who itemized their income-tax deductions could claim
a tax deduction for 25% of their health insurance costs. This subsidy therefore lowered the after-
tax price of health insurance for those self-employed individuals who itemized their deductions.
Gruber and Poterba (1994) calculated the average after-tax price of health insurance relative to self-
insurance, for employed and self-employed individuals before and after TRA86. Their calculations
are presented in Table 1 and reveal that the after-tax price reductions were sizeable for the self-
employed but negligible for those in wage-employment. For the high-income self-employed, the
price reduction was in excess of 10%. However, since the subsidy was restricted to those who were
not eligible for health coverage through the spouse, it is only this group of workers that received
the ‘treatment’. We would therefore expect (1) more single workers and (2) more married workers
without the benefit of spousal health insurance, to select into self-employment after TRA86. This
is the prediction I propose to test in Section 5.
There is some evidence of a strong behavioral response from variation in insurance premiums at
the state level. In August 1993, the New Jersey Individual Health Coverage Plan (IHCP) introduced
guarantees on availability and renewability of health insurance in the individual market, and also
imposed pure community rating on insurance premiums, as a means of breaking the historical link
between wage employment and health coverage. DeCicca (2008) estimated the impact of these
changes on the incidence of self-employment in New Jersey between 1991 and 1996, relative to a
set of other states in the U.S. that did not introduce any reforms in the insurance market. He
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found evidence of a significant increase in self-employment in New Jersey. Moreover, the impact
was more pronounced among single, older and less-healthy individuals, the groups that were likely
to benefit more from these reforms.
Fairlie et.al.(2008) examine whether the system of employer-provided health insurance in the
U.S. has impeded entrepreneurial activity, a situation they refer to as ‘entrepreneurship lock’. They
examine transitions from wage-employment to self-employment using CPS data, as a function of
family health status and access to alternative health insurance options. They also exploit the
discontinuity in health insurance coverage at age 65 created by Medicare, studying entrepreneurship
behaviour of individuals below age 65 to those above. Using this strategy, however, it is difficult
to disentangle the price effect of health insurance from a preference to transition into retirement
gradually by working fewer hours, which is afforded by self-employment.6 For this reason, the
TRA86 is potentially a better instrument for identifying the price effect of health insurance on the
propensity for self-employment.
Figure 1 plots self-employment rates for men and women between 1979 and 1989, using data
from the March supplement files of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The sharp increase in
self-employment rates for both men and women following the TRA86, is clearly evident from the
graph. Although the increase is more pronounced for men, I focus on women because women’s
health insurance coverage and employment decisions are likely to be more endogenous with respect
to their spouse’s compensation package, compared to those of men.
One major challenge arises in using the TRA86 experiment to estimate the effect on employment
sector choices. In addition to introducing the tax subsidy for the self-employed, TRA86 also
lowered marginal tax rates significantly. If this is the primary reason for the trend increase in self-
employment that figure 1 reflects, then I may be wrongly attributing these increases to the change
in the price of health insurance implied by the tax subsidy. I address this concern and present
evidence suggesting that lowered marginal tax rates are not the primary source of my findings.
A series of amendments made to the TRA86 between 1996 and 2003 gradually increased the
tax credit for health insurance purchases by the self-employed, from 25% to 100%. These changes
were not accompanied by changes in the marginal tax rate schedule. Gumus and Regan (2009)
examine the impact of these amendments on entry and exit rates into self-employment, and on
the propensity to be self-employed among men. They find significant but small effects on entry,
but no effects on exit rates or on the likelihood of being self-employed. Self-employment over the
6See Zissimopoulos et.al. (2007) and Giandrea et.al. (2008), for instance.
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1993-2003 period does not exhibit an increasing trend; male self-employment actually declined over
this period (CPS, March supplement, various years). Moreover, the gradual nature of the increase
in subsidy over this period makes it difficult to identify significant changes in trend that can be
attributed to the subsidy. For this reason, I consider the impact of the original TRA86 subsidy,
which was discrete and sizeable, relative to the 1996-2003 amendments.7
In order to identify the effect of the price of health insurance on self-employment propensities,
I use both cross-sectional variation - between women with actual or potential health insurance
coverage through their spouse versus women without - and the time-series variation - before versus
after TRA86. Each of these sources is likely to be correlated with other factors affecting the
incidence of self-employment. By using both these sources of variation however, I can eliminate
spurious factors correlated with each degree of variation individually and arrive at an estimate that
denotes the price effect of TRA86 on the assignment of women across employment sectors. This is
the approach that I will use below.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) data, which collects detailed information on per-
sonal and family characteristics of respondents, labor force variables and health insurance status in
the previous calendar year. However in the March files before 1989, owner-operators of incorporated
businesses were coded as wage-salary workers. This is problematic for my analysis. Fortunately,
the May CPS data files contain one question pertaining to the current job of the respondent, where
both the unincorporated and incorporated self-employed are separately classified.
I match the March and May CPS files for 2 years - 1984 and 1985 - to create a sample of women
for the pre-TRA86 period. This way, I get all the data on labor force and personal characteristics
and health insurance status from the March files and a correct identification of self-employed workers
from the May files. However, the labor force information pertains to the main job during the week
prior to the survey while the health information refers to the longest job held the previous year.
While this is likely to cause a mismatch between job characteristics and insurance status for a
subset of our sample, a number of papers (Swartz (1986) and Shore-Sheppard (1996)) find that
March CPS respondents interpret the health insurance questions as pertaining to their current job,
7Seldon (2009) used the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to investigate the impact of TRA amendments on
private insurance coverage. He found evidence of substantial increase in coverage among self-employed workers.
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and answer accordingly. To the extent that this occurs, it not only mitigates the problem but also
suggests that using retrospective employment status and job characteristics data is likely to cause
similar problems. From 1989 on, the March CPS files contain separate data on the incorporated
self-employed. For data after 1988, I therefore use the March files alone.
All persons 15 years and older in the survey who worked in the previous calendar year were
asked if they participated in group health insurance plans offered by their employer. I matched
the husband-wife pairs in the data and used the responses to these questions to ascertain whether
a married woman’s spouse had employer-provided health insurance coverage.8 A married woman
whose spouse has health insurance coverage through his employer is more likely to be covered
under the same plan. Therefore, this variable proxies for the price of health insurance; women
whose spouse has an employer-provided health plan can be thought of as paying a smaller price for
selecting into self-employment, relative to women whose spouse does not have coverage.
Since the policy changes introduced in the TRA86 went into effect in 1988, I combine data
from the March CPS files from 1990 and 1991 to construct a post-TRA86 sample of women. To
keep the data consistent across the two periods, I use the labor force information pertaining to the
week prior to the survey. I focus on women aged between 18 and 64, who are employed in civilian,
non-agricultural occupations or not employed. Individuals reporting themselves to be self-employed
on their main job during the week prior to the survey are classified as self-employed.
Table 2 records employment status by marital status. While self-employment rose among all
marital groups over the two time periods, the largest increases were among married women with
no access to spousal health insurance coverage, and previously married women. In contrast, the
incidence of wage-employment decreased among married women with no spousal health insurance,
previously married and never married women, while it rose among married women with access to
spousal health coverage.
Table 3 gives the characteristics of employed and non-employed women in the two time periods,
1984-85 and 1990-91.9 On average, self-employed women tend to be older than their counterparts in
wage-salary employment and this difference has increased over time. Women who are not employed
8Individuals who respond in the affirmative to whether they have employer-provided health insurance are asked
whether their spouse and children are also covered by the same policy. Thus, it is possible to determine whether a
married woman has coverage under her husband’s employer-provided health insurance plan. However, to mitigate
the endogeneity of insurance coverage, I only use the husband’s own coverage status as a covariate.
9To minimize measurement error due to possible mis-coding of the unemployed and those out of the labor force,
I combine both these categories into the non-employed category.
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are older than those employed. Average educational attainment increased for all women over the
two time periods. The increases were highest in the college education categories, especially among
the self-employed. The predominance of white women in self-employment has also been noted by
other studies and is clearly reflected in Table 3. Not surprisingly, a larger fraction of women who
are not employed have dependents living in the household.
The differences by marital status are more dramatic. A significantly higher proportion of self-
employed women are married, constituting over 75% of all self-employed women in each of the two
time periods despite a sharp decrease in this category across all groups. Among the sub-sample
of married women, a larger fraction of self-employed women have a spouse who is covered by his
employer-provided health plan, relative to married women in the other sectors. This suggests that
the cost of health insurance may be an important determinant of the employment decision. At the
same time, a large fraction of self-employed women’s spouses are also self-employed. This fraction
is significantly higher than the corresponding fraction for both wage and salaried women and non-
working women in both time periods. This suggests that household employment-sector decisions are
also driven by preferences and not solely by the cost of health insurance. These patterns reinforce
the argument that the joint distribution of employment-sector choices and spousal health insurance
offers limited information on the relationship between health insurance prices and employment-
sector choices. The tax reform act of 1986, by providing an exogenous source of variation in health
insurance prices, allows us to potentially identify this relationship.
4 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Self-Employment
The hypothesis that I am testing in this paper is the following: since TRA86 lowered the price of
health insurance for the self-employed, this policy change induced more single women and more
married women without health insurance coverage through their spouse’s insurance plan, to se-
lect into self-employment, relative to married women who already had access to health insurance
coverage through their spouse. TRA86 explicitly includes a provision disqualifying self-employed
individuals who are eligible for insurance coverage through a spouse, from taking advantage of the
tax subsidy (Gruber and Poterba (1994)). Therefore, this group serves as a good control group,
and the difference-in-difference estimate is given by the following equation:
∆2 = (SE1991a − SE1985a ) − (SE1991b − SE1985b ) (1)
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where SEt denotes the percentage self-employed at period t and the subscripts a and b refer to
our comparison groups - either single and married women respectively or women without and with
spousal health coverage, respectively.
Health insurance prices may impact not only the choice of employment sector but the labor
market participation decision itself. For instance, Eissa (1995) estimated an increase in the labor
force participation rate of high-income married women following TRA86, which she attributed to
the lowering of marginal tax rates. This implies that the characteristics of women working in 1990-
91 are likely to be quite different from those working in 1984-85, and failure to account for this
might lead to a composition bias in estimates using the limited sample of employed women. It is
therefore important to include the non-employed in the analysis and treat non-employment as a
separate state. Thus, I also present estimates from a multinomial logit (MNL) model, by expanding
my sample to include women who are not employed.
5 Estimates
Table 4 presents marginal effects from a probit model of self-employment, estimated separately for
single and married women. Each specification controls for a detailed set of individual characteris-
tics.10 I first test for patterns observed in Table 3.
The estimates in the first column are for the sub-sample of single women, while those in the
second and third columns are for married women. Comparing the first and second columns, the
probability of being self-employed rises with age and education. However, single women with
more than 5 years of college education are more likely to take up self-employment, while married
women in this category are as likely to be self-employed as married women with very low education.
Single, white women are 68% more likely than non-whites to be self-employed while among married
women, this gap is about 47%.11 While the CPS does not collect any information on household
10I also tried to exploit the quasi-panel structure of the CPS. In the CPS sampling rotation, households are
interviewed for four consecutive months, and after a break of eight months, are interviewed again for four consecutive
months. Respondents can be linked across two years because the second set of interviews take place in the same
calendar months as the first set of interviews (Welch, 1993). I matched individuals across the 1988 and 1989 surveys,
to get a sample of women from the year before TRA86 went into effect (1987) and the consecutive year. However,
since there was little change in characteristics of the individuals across the two years, the results were not significant,
and are not reported here.
11All percentages are calculated as the ratio of the corresponding marginal effect to the predicted probability of
self-employment at the mean levels of all control variables, which is 0.0396 for single women and 0.0906 for married
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assets, it does include family income from sources other than earnings. This variable can be used
as a proxy for family wealth, to control for liquidity constraints that might restrict women’s choice
of employment sectors (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). I create an indicator variable that equals
1 for individuals whose annual family non-earnings income in real terms was over $50,000, and
0 for whom it was $50,000 or less. Its effect is positive, sizeable and significant, suggesting that
non-earnings income is an important determinant of self-employment.12 Single women were 21%
more likely to be self-employed in the post-TRA86 period, relative to the pre-TRA86 period while
the corresponding coefficient is not significant for married women.
Regardless of marital status, women residing in states that do not levy state income tax are
no more likely to take up self-employment relative to women in other states. However, higher
income taxes discourage self-employment.13 A notable difference between these two groups is in
the effect of having dependents; while this variable has no impact for single women, it increases the
probability of self-employment among married women by 36% relative to married women with no
dependents.
In the third column of Table 4, I add controls for husband’s employment sector as well as his
health insurance coverage status for the sub-sample of married women.14 In this specification, the
marginal effect of the post-reform period is negative and significant; married women are 11% less
likely to be self-employed after TRA86, controlling for husband’s employment sector and health
insurance status. The health coverage estimate indicates that married women with a husband who
has health insurance coverage are 35% more likely to be self-employed, relative to married women
whose spouse has no coverage through his employer. One interpretation of this result is that the
access to health coverage for the wife through the husband’s employer-provided health plan creates
a wedge in the price of health insurance between married women enjoying this privilege and other
women.
12I have not included industry and occupation controls on the grounds that the industry and occupation choices
may be jointly determined with the self-employment choice.
13To get around the endogeneity of income tax rates, I re-estimated the probit regressions by replacing the marginal
tax rates with the average marginal tax rates, grouped by the three education groups. The results were similar and
are not reported here.
14In the CPS, the question used to determine whether the husband has employment-based health coverage asks
whether the respondent participates in group health coverage offered by his employer. If the husband is self-employed,
he might be referring to himself as the employer while responding to this question. For this reason, it seems important
to control for his employment sector while estimating the impact of his health coverage on his wife’s propensity to
be self-employed, a point emphasized by Lombard (2001).
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women. This price effect in turn affects the assignment of women across different sectors of the
economy.
However, there may be several other reasons why women with no access to spousal health
insurance coverage do not select into self-employment. By comparing these women with similar
characteristics before and after the tax reform, we can control for other factors influencing the
decision to become self-employed that may be correlated with having no spousal health coverage.
By comparing the change in the incidence of self-employment between women without and with
spousal health coverage, we can control for other changes in the economy that may have affected
the overall incidence of self-employment, including TRA86. As long as there were no exogenous
shocks affecting only one of these groups over this period, this method gives us a difference-in-
difference estimate of the effect of TRA86 on the incidence of self-employment. To calculate the
double-difference estimates described in the above section, I run the following regression:
Ei = α+ γ1(Married, spouse− no− health− coverage) + γ2(Previously −Married)+ (2)
γ3(Never −Married) + γ4Y ear + γ5(Married, spouse− no− health− coverage ∗ Y ear)+
γ6(Previously −Married ∗ Y ear) + γ7(Never −Married ∗ Y ear) + γ8.Xi + εi,
where Ei = 1 if the woman is self-employed and Ei = 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of controls,
‘Married,spouse-no-health-coverage’ is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the woman is mar-
ried and her husband does not have health coverage, ‘Previously-married’ is an indicator for a
divorced/widowed/separated woman, ‘Never-Married’ is an indicator for a never married woman,
‘Post-Reform’ is another indicator variable which equals 1 if the observation is from 1990-91 and
equals 0 if its from 1984-85 and εi is a normally distributed error term. Our control group here is
married women with access to health coverage through their spouse. Since this is the group which
remained unaffected by TRA86, we expect the self-employment incidence for all the ‘treatment’
groups to increase in the post-reform period. Thus, my prediction is that γ5, γ6 and γ7 are all
positive.
Table 5 presents the difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of TRA86 on self-employment
propensities, based on a probit regression. I calculate the marginal effects on the interaction terms
using the method outlined by Ai et. al. (2004). I average the marginal effect across individuals
to get the average marginal effect. The Delta method is used to compute standard errors.15 The
15Note that marginal effects based on the method proposed by Ai et.al. (2004) are smaller than those based solely
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estimates are positive and significant for all three treatment groups. The marginal effects indicate
that in the post-reform period, married women who did not have access to spousal health insurance,
previously married women and never married women were 50% , 59% and 38% more likely to be
self-employed respectively, relative to their corresponding pre-reform rates implied by the regression
(0.0804, 0.0456 and 0.0474 respectively). When measured as a fraction of the predicted probabilities
of self-employment estimated by the regression (0.0705), the marginal effects imply a 57%, 38%
and 25% increase in self-employment respectively among the three treatment groups.16
The results in Table 5 are based on treatment and control groups that are endogenously de-
termined. For example, the wife’s ability to obtain subsidized health insurance through her self-
employment status could impact the husband’s decision to choose a job that offers health insurance
versus one that does not. To get around this endogeneity, I next use marital status to divide up my
sample into potential treatment and control groups. Single women represent the ‘uncontaminated’
sub-group of the treatment group for TRA86, since they cannot have access to spousal health
coverage. I therefore estimate the effect of TRA86 on the self-employment probabilities of single
women, relative to married women. I run the following regression:
Ei = α+ γ9Single+ γ10Y ear + γ11(Single.Y ear) + γ12Xi + εi, (3)
where Ei = 1 if the woman is self-employed and Ei = 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of controls, Single
is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the woman is single (never married, divorced, widowed
or separated) and equals 0 if she is married, and all the other terms are as defined for the earlier
specification. The coefficient γ11 measures the double-difference - the effect of the tax subsidy on
single womens propensity to be self-employed, relative to married women. Again, γ11 is predicted
to be positive. The results are presented in Table 6.
The differential effect of being single in the post-TRA86 period is indeed positive and significant.
The estimates indicate that while married women were also more likely to be self-employed following
the tax reform, the time difference was about three times higher for single women. The marginal
effect indicates that single women in the post-TRA86 period were 17% more likely to take up self-
employment relative to their pre-reform rate of 4.59%. This is a sizeable effect. The marginal effect
on the interaction terms such as γ5 , γ6 and γ7 in equation 4. There is some controversy regarding which of these
methods captures the true treatment effect of a policy change (Puhani, 2008). I have chosen to report the more
conservative estimates here.
16I also estimated all the Probit regressions clustered by marital status (Moulton, 1986) to obtain clustered standard
errors. There was no qualitative change in the results. The results are not reported.
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implies a 10% increase in self-employment among single women, when measured as a fraction of
the predicted probability of self-employment generated by the regression, 0.0811.17
In addition to introducing the tax subsidy for the self-employed, TRA86 also significantly low-
ered marginal tax rates; it lowered the top marginal tax rate by 44% while the decrease was less
significant for those at the lower end of the income distribution (Feldstein, 1986). A lowering of tax
rates increases the after-tax price of employer-provided health insurance, thus lowering the value
of this form of insurance relative to self-insurance. However, the predominant effect of lowered tax
rates is expected to be on labor supply, notably on the extensive margin; Eissa (1995) showed that
the labor force participation of high-income married women increased after TRA86, as a result of
the decrease in marginal tax rates. One concern that arises is that my findings might have very
little to do with the price of health insurance and might simply reflect the fact that, following
TRA86, lowered tax rates made employment in all sectors more attractive to women.
Figure 2 plots the trend in paid employment over the 1979-1989 period. The figure reveals no
discernible change in the overall trend, following TRA86. Wage employment rates for men show a
slight decline. While there is a slight upward trend in these rates for women, this increase is not as
sharp as the trend in self-employment, suggesting that increases in self-employment rates after the
reform were not driven by changes in the marginal tax rates alone. Hausman and Poterba (1987)
estimated the distribution of changes in marginal tax rates in the population, following the changes
introduced by the TRA86. Their calculations are reproduced in Figure 3, and reveal that a very
small share of households - around 11% - experienced a fall in the marginal tax rate in excess of
10%. For the majority of households, the decrease was modest. A sizeable share of households -
around 14% - faced no change at all while a significant fraction actually experienced an increase in
the rate facing them. Thus, while nearly 60% of households faced decreases in marginal tax rates,
the decrease was extremely modest for the majority of these households.
Moore (2003) estimated the effect of lowered marginal and average tax rates on self-employment,
using the tax reforms of 1986 and 1993 as natural experiments. While he reports a small negative
effect of the 1986 reforms on self-employment, his results are not robust to alternate specifications
and sample restrictions. He finds that other factors such as education, attitude towards risk and
17As a robustness check, I estimated the difference-in-difference estimate of self-employment propensities for single
and married women for 1996 relative to 1994, a period when the tax subsidy was increased from 25% to 30%. While
the estimate was positive, suggesting that self-employment increased relatively more among single women relative to
married women, it was not statistically significant. The results are not reported here.
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wealth seem more important in explaining self-employment decisions, relative to tax rates. He
concludes that “...changing marginal tax rates does not seem to be the best policy tool for promoting
self-employment.” (Moore, 2003, p.25). Using aggregated individual data from seven decennial
Censuses of Population in the U.S., Fairlie and Meyer (1998) also found no significant relationship
between tax rates and self-employment.
Taken together, the various pieces of evidence cited above suggest that the effect of lowered
income taxes on self-employment following TRA86, was likely to have been modest. To attribute
the increased propensity for self-employment implied by the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 entirely
to lowered marginal tax rates, one would have to argue that lowering income tax rates made self-
employment more attractive to single women, while not changing the desirability of paid employ-
ment. This argument is difficult to support, as higher rates of self-employment are typically associ-
ated with high marginal tax rates, presumably because it is easier to under-report self-employment
income relative to wage-salary income (Blau, 1987). Moore’s (2003) results are consistent with this
view.
The net cost savings from the tax subsidy were presumably quite small, for most individuals.
Thus, the question arises whether the increases in self-employment found here are plausible, given
the magnitude of the decrease in net insurance costs. According to Gruber and Poterba (1994),
TRA86 led to a 6.8 percentage point increase in private insurance coverage among the self-employed
(men and women), relative to the employed (Gruber and Poterba (1994), Table VI, p.720). One
could imagine that this increased take-up was driven entirely by women who were already self-
employed, with no increase in self-employment rates due to TRA86, giving us a lower bound of
0 for the impact of the TRA86 subsidy on self-employment. At the other extreme, this increased
take-up could be accounted for entirely by new entrants into self-employment, with no change in
the insurance status of those already self-employed when TRA86 was announced. This gives us an
upper bound of 6.8 percentage points that can be attributed to the tax subsidy. The estimates in
Tables 4 and 5 lie well within these bounds - between 1 and 4 percentage points - and thus provide
confidence in the plausibility of the estimates. Gruber and Madrian (2002), in their review paper,
report a lower bound of 10% and an upper bound of 35% for the magnitude of ‘job-lock’. My
estimates of the impact of the TRA86 subsidy on self-employment are between 17% and 33%, and
are thus consistent with those of the ‘job-lock’ literature as well.
The 1980s was a period of increasing labor force participation among women in the United
States. Moreover, as discussed above, there is evidence suggesting that TRA86 increased female
15
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labor force participation, especially that of married women. In this section, I address the concern
that restricting the sample solely to employed women could introduce a composition bias in the
estimates. I expand the sample to include non-employed women and extend the analysis to in-
corporate all three employment-status outcomes - working in paid employment, self-employed and
not-employed.
The effect of the TRA86 on self-employment is now estimated using a multinomial logit model,
pooling data from before and after the tax reform. The results are presented in Table 7, which
reports parameter estimates for the variables of interest, based on a specification that is analogous to
equation 3. The relative risk ratios for wage-employment and non-employment are shown, relative
to the self-employment outcome, along with the corresponding marginal effects. As expected,
relative to married women, single women are over two times more likely to be in paid employment
than non-employment, with a substantial marginal effect. In the post-reform period, however,
single women were less likely to be in paid employment relative to self-employment. Similarly, they
were also much less likely to be non-employed, relative to self-employment.
The marginal effect of the interaction term (Single*Post-TRA86) for the self-employment out-
come is 0.01, which is significant at the 95% level. The self-employment rate among single women,
as a proportion of all women (employed as well as non-employed) was 3.08% in the pre-TRA86
period. The marginal effect of 0.01 thus implies a 33% increase in self-employment among sin-
gle women, relative to the pre-TRA86 period. This is almost two times the increase implied by
the Probit estimates, based solely on employed women. Measured as a fraction of the predicted
probability of self-employment implied by the multinomial regression (0.0619), the marginal effect
implies an increase of 16%.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I study the effect of the husband’s employer-provided family health insurance on the
wifes propensity to select into self-employment. A consistent finding in the literature on womens
self-employment in the U.S. since the mid-1970s is the predominance of married women in this
sector. While numerous papers have remarked on the relationship between spousal health insurance
and a married womans propensity to be self-employed, the lack of an exogenous source of variation
in health insurance prices made it difficult to convincingly test for a causal effect of insurance prices
on employment-sector choices.
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) provides us with an opportunity to test this relationship.
The TRA86 introduced a tax subsidy for the self-employed to purchase health insurance. Self-
employed individuals who were already enjoying health insurance benefits through a spouse were
excluded from this benefit. Since the effect of the tax subsidy was to lower the after-tax price of
health insurance for those among the self-employed who were purchasing their own health insurance,
I predict that this subsidy increased the incidence of self-employment among this group of women.
My findings are in line with Gruber and Poterba (1994), who estimate large increases in in-
surance take-up following the introduction of the tax subsidy in TRA86, especially among single
individuals.18 The arguments put forth and the evidence presented are an attempt to persuade
readers that while the estimates may be overstating the impact of the tax subsidy on the incidence
of self-employment, the true effect is still sizeable. My estimates indicate that health insurance cov-
erage through the spouse strongly influenced a married woman’s employment sector choice towards
self-employment in the pre-TRA86 period. Moreover, the incidence of self-employment among
single women went up between 10% and 33% depending on the specification, in the postTRA86
period.
These findings support the hypothesis that the decrease in the after-tax price of health insurance
through the tax subsidy lowered the cost of selecting into self-employment for those women who had
no spousal health coverage. The findings in this paper suggest that in the pre-TRA86 period, the
high cost of health insurance created a significant wedge in the price of health insurance between
the wage-salary sector and self-employment. Women who had a preference for working in the self-
employment sector and who enjoyed spousal health benefits were able to exercise their preference
and select into self-employment. On the other hand, for some women with a preference for the
self-employment sector but constrained to purchase their own health insurance, it was too costly
to opt for this sector. For these women, the TRA86, by narrowing this price wedge, lowered the
price of selecting into their desired sector of employment.
18Gumus and Regan (2007) also find a large responsive to health insurance prices among single women.
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Figure 2: Wage-Employment Rates
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Figure 3: Marginal Tax Rate Change Distribution, following TRA86
Source: Hausman and Poterba (1987), Fig.1, p.104
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Table 1: Average After-Tax Price of Health Insurance
Category Before TRA86 After TRA86
Self-Employed 1.410 1.334
(0.074) (0.055)
Employed 0.922 0.920
(0.045) (0.045)
High-income Self-Employed 1.455 1.307
(0.065) (0.041)
Low-income Self-Employed 1.389 1.355
(0.078) (0.068)
High-income Employed 0.900 0.902
(0.038) (0.029)
Low-income Employed 0.950 0.953
(0.046) (0.042)
Source: Gruber and Poterba (1994), Table I, p.709. The prices are calculated as the ratio
of the tax-adjusted price of health insurance to the cost of self-insurance for each category.
‘High-income’ refers to incomes in excess of $50,000 in 1985 dollars while ‘low-income’ refers
to incomes below $20,000. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 3: Percent Distribution of Women Workers in Non-Agricultural Occupations,
and the Non-Employed, by Selected Characteristics, 1984-85 and 1990-91
Wage Employment Self-Employment Non-Employed
1984-85 1990-91 1984-85 1990-91 1984-85 1990-91
(63.38%) (65.49%) (5.37%) (5.80%) (31.25%) (28.71%)
Age (Years) Mean 38.75 38.32 41.28 42.45 43.73 43.13
(11.61) (11.19) (10.84) (10.44) (13.26) (13.66)
Dependents Yes 23.39 21.30 24.19 21.64 30.13 30.34
(42.33) (40.94) (42.84) (41.18) (45.88) (45.97)
Race White 85.89 84.22 93.7700 92.35 87.51 83.36
(34.82) (36.46) (24.17) (26.58) (33.06) (37.25)
Live in Central City 25.59 24.77 20.17 18.66 25.46 26.97
(43.64) (43.17) (40.14) (38.96) (43.56) (44.38)
Education HS and Less 57.79 50.15 53.46 48.33 74.24 68.25
(49.39) (50.01) (49.89) (49.98) (43.73) (46.55)
Some College 36.68 42.67 41.40 43.12 23.94 28.18
(48.20) (49.46) (49.27) (49.53) (42.67) (44.99)
> 5 yrs College 5.53 7.18 5.14 8.55 1.82 3.57
(22.85) (25.82) (22.10) (27.97) (13.38) (18.55)
Marital Status D/W/S 19.39 19.88 11.54 15.13 13.57 16.07
(39.53) (39.91) (31.95) (35.84) (34.25) (36.73)
Never Married 9.52 16.91 3.42 6.21 4.20 10.62
(29.35) (37.49) (18.17) (24.15) (20.05) (30.81)
Married 71.09 63.21 85.05 78.65 82.23 73.31
(45.34) (48.22) (35.67) (40.98) (38.23) (44.23)
Husband SE 7.38 10.71 26.20 41.54 9.82 14.50
(26.15) (30.93) (43.98) (49.29) (29.76) (35.21)
Husband has 43.10 48.61 50.83 50.46 47.48 48.99
EHI∗ (49.52) (49.98) (50.01) (50.00) (49.94) (49.99)
Live in State with Yes 13.77 15.36 15.94 16.73 13.40 14.90
No State Taxes (34.46) (36.06) (36.62) (37.33) (34.06) (35.61)
Observations 21,558 56,841 1,827 5,038 10,629 24,919
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations
* EMI - Health insurance through employer 27
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Table 4: Probit Estimates of Women’s Self-Employment Choices
(Marginal Effects)
Single Married
1 2 3
Age (years) 0.0072*** 0.0134*** 0.0108***
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Live in Central City -0.0015 -0.0151*** -0.0095***
(0.0025) (0.003) (0.0030)
Education
Base Category: High School and less
Some College 0.0122*** 0.0124*** 0.0057**
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025)
> 5 yrs College 0.0379*** -0.0016 -0.0049
(0.0063) (0.0051) (0.0048)
Race=White 0.027*** 0.0423*** 0.0316***
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Post-TRA86 0.0085*** 0.0017 -0.009***
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028)
Dependents = Yes -0.0013 0.0328*** 0.0338***
(0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Family Income>50,000+ 0.0836*** 0.0681*** 0.0403***
(in 2000 $) (0.0219) (0.0121) (0.0113)
Live in No-Tax State 0.0099 0.0038 0.0009
(Live NSIT) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.006)
Live NSIT*Post-Tra86 -0.0072 0.0151** 0.0133*
(0.0067) (0.008) (0.0076)
Federal MTR -0.0009*** -0.001*** -0.0016***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Husband has EHI+ 0.028***
(0.0025)
Husband SE++ 0.2169***
(0.0056)
Predicted Probability 0.0396 0.0906 0.0801
Log Pseudolikelihood -5,014.09 -17,789.87 -16,108.88
Observations 27,726 57,538 56,121
Note: Figures in parentheses are (robust) standard errors; +EHI - Employer-provided health insurance; ++SE - Self-Employed
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Self-Employment Propensities by Marital Status
(N=85,264)
1984-85 1990-91 Time Difference % change+
Treatment Groups:
T1. Married women with No 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.1068∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗
Spousal Health Ins. (0.0032) ( 0.0025) (0.0041)
T2. Divorced/Separated/ 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0584∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗
Widowed Women (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0039)
T3. Never Married Women 0.0474 ∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0038
(0.0057) (0.0031) (0.0065)
Control Group:
C1. Married women with Spousal 0.1033∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ -0.0142∗∗∗
Health Ins. (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0038)
Group Difference for a given period:
T1 Vs. C1 -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0177∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0032)
T2 Vs. C1 -0.1033∗∗∗ -0.0891∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0029)
T3 Vs. C1 -0.1065∗∗∗ -0.0913∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0036)
Difference-in-Difference: T1 Vs. C1 0.0406∗∗∗ 50(57)
(0.0055)
T2 Vs. C1 0.027∗∗∗ 59 (38)
(0.0054)
T3 Vs. C1 0.018∗∗ 38 (25)
(0.0075)
Predicted Probability at X 0.0705
Note: This table reports the marginal effects from the estimates of equation 4. Dependent variable takes the value 1 if individual is self-
employed, 0 otherwise. The regression includes controls for age, education, race, residence in central city, residence in state with no state
income taxes, presence of dependent children, estimated federal marginal taxes and family non-earnings income. Standard errors, using the
Delta method, are in parentheses.
+ Percentage changes are calculated as the corresponding marginal effect divided by the respective self-employment rates in the pre-TRA86
period (0.0804, 0.0456 and 0.0474 respectively). The figures in parentheses provide an alternative metric: percentage changes calculated by
dividing the corresponding marginal effects by the predicted probability of self-employment, 0.0705.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 6: Difference-in-Difference Estimates of Self-Employment Propensities: Single Vs. Married
Women (N=73,604)
1984-85 1990-91 Time Difference % change
Treatment Group:
T: Single Women 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0585 ∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0041)
Control Group:
C: Married Women 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0038)
Group Difference for a given period:
T Vs. C -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0408∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.0029)
Difference-in-Difference: .0078∗ 17 (10)
(0.0049)
Predicted probability at X 0.0811
Note:This table reports the marginal effects from the estimates of equation 5. Dependent variable takes the value
1 if individual is self-employed, 0 otherwise. The regression includes controls for age, education, race, residence in
central city, residence in state with no state income taxes, presence of dependent children, interaction of indicator
for dependent children with marital status, estimated federal marginal taxes, spouse’s health insurance status
and family non-earnings income. Standard errors, using the Delta method, are in parentheses.
+ Percentage changes are calculated as the corresponding marginal effect divided by the self-employment rate
in the pre-TRA86 period (0.0459). The figure in parenthesis provides an alternative metric:percentage changes
calculated by dividing the marginal effect by the predicted predicted probability of self-employment, 0.0811.
*** - significant at the 99% level; ** - significant at the 95% level;* - significant at the 90% level
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Table 7: Multinomial Logit Results - Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) and Marginal Effects
(N=106,150)
Wage Employment Non-Employment Self-Employment
Base Outcome - Self Employment
Relative Marginal Relative Marginal Marginal
Risk Ratio Effect Risk Ratio Effect Effect
Control Group: Married Women
Treatment Group: Single Women (Single) 2.2123∗∗∗ 0.1277∗∗∗ 1.1304 -0.0472∗∗∗
(0.1836) (0.0981)
Post-TRA86 (Post) 0.9495 -0.0035 0.9435 0.0008
(0.0326) (0.0344)
Single*Post 0.8466 ∗∗ -0.0125∗∗ 0.8535∗∗ -0.0005 0.01∗∗
(0.0741) (0.0782)
Predicted probability at X 0.6645 0.2736 0.0619
Log-Likelihood -77,067.22
Pseudo R2 0.1181
Note: The regressions includes controls for age, education, race, residence in central city, residence in state with
no state income taxes, marginal tax rates and indicator for presence of dependent children. Figures in parentheses
are robust standard errors.
*** - significant at 99% level; ** - significant at 95% level; * - significant at 90% level
31
Page 30 of 30Contemporary Economic Policy
